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Abstract:

In this work we intend to review from a critical perspective the ‘patrimonial capitalism’
approach, as well as its analysis of wage-labor transformations in developed
economies during the last thirty years. For this purpose, we take the economies of
France and the United States as study cases.

According to this approach (developed by the French Regulation School and other
adjacent authors), patrimonial financialization of working households has involved a
radical transformation of the wage-labor nexus, paradigmatically exemplified by the
concept of employee shareholding. We will try to point out what we consider
weaknesses of this approach, theoretical as well as empirical.

Furthermore, we focus on an alternative interpretation that characterizes the nature of
wage-labor nexus transformation in the French and US economies as a wage
adjustment. This wage adjustment, as we observe in our work, is the result of the
neoliberal policies developed to restore capital profitability after the crisis of the 1970s,
and has caused an erosion of salary and social conquests attained by labor after the
Second World War. Finances have acted as a lever of social reorganization among
classes to achieve the objective of profitability recovery.
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1. Introduction
The important transformations experienced by the world economy in the past three decades
have crucially affected some aspects of the wage-labor nexus. Although there is some
agreement between different heterodox interpretations regarding the nature of these
transformations and the contemporary world economy in general, different interpretations do
arise over the type of changes experienced in the realm of labor. Among such, we will
analyze in this text a particular interpretation: those authors who label the current world
economy as ‘patrimonial capitalism’. We will carry out a critical review of this approach,
proposing an alternative interpretation by which the theoretical weaknesses detected may be
overcome.
Although we find important deficiencies in the analysis developed by the authors of the
‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach, we consider a review of this theoretical proposal
appropriate for several reasons. First of all, because it is a heterodox analysis with significant
incidence in the academic research, the political implications of which deserve to be
assessed in a critical way. Additionally, it is an analysis that coherently integrates changes in
the wage-labor nexus with a wider conceptualization of the new growth regime (denominated
‘patrimonial capitalism’). We find this to be a valuable perspective compared to those labor
market analyses that ignore the main economic transformations after the crisis of Fordism.
Furthermore, the authors of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach develop certain
fundamental aspects in order to conceptualize changes not considered by other analyses of
the wage-labor nexus: transformations registered in financial markets, and the mechanisms
by which these transformations affect corporations. Finally, the weaknesses of this approach
present an important incentive for analysis. Detection of said weaknesses allows us to
consider and question certain crucial aspects, in order to elaborate a proposal explaining the
nature of wage-labor nexus transformations.
After pointing out in this introduction the object of our work, in the second section we briefly
review the general interpretation developed by the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach
concerning current transformations in the world economy and changes experienced by
wage-labor nexus. As we shall see, the authors of the approach outline these changes as a
radical transformation of the wage-labor nexus, paradigmatically exemplified by the concept
of employee shareholding. In the third section we point out what we consider to be
weaknesses of this approach, theoretical as well as empirical. In the fourth part, and in a
tentative way, we propose an alternative interpretation that, in trying to overcome detected
weaknesses, characterizes the nature of transformations in wage-labor nexus in the French
and US economies. Our interpretation is an unfinished work, as it corresponds to an open
line of research. Nevertheless, we outline elements that should be included in any analysis
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that seeks to understand, from a critical perspective, transformations in the wage-labor
nexus.

2.

‘Patrimonial

capitalism’

and

wage-labor

nexus

transformation:

employee

shareholding
2.1. An interpretation of the contemporary world economy: the ‘patrimonial capitalism’
approach
During the second half of the 1990s and around certain works of Aglietta 1 , some French
authors opened a research line about the new growth regime after Fordism. Although the
core of these authors –Boyer, Orléan, and Aglietta– belong to the Regulation School, this
discussion has also been fed by contributions from other theoretical perspectives which we
will also consider, especially the works of Jeffers, Plihon, and Chesnais. The original
proposal presented by Aglietta in his first works has been clarified or questioned by the other
authors as well as by himself, moving some distance from the initial proposal in recent years.
Nevertheless, beyond minor discrepancies not relevant to this synthesis, the research line
opened by these authors has given rise to a coherent characterization which, citing Aglietta’s
expression, we denominate ‘patrimonial capitalism’ 2 .
According to Aglietta (1998; 2005), the main characteristics of ‘patrimonial capitalism’ are the
extension of employee shareholding; the importance of institutional investors in corporate
governance; and the new role played by financial markets in national macroeconomic
adjustments. This is why he proposes the term ‘patrimonial’ to define the contemporary world
economy: ‘The denomination `patrimonial regime´ makes reference to the predominant role
played by capital markets, which configure the wealth of households in the determination of
macroeconomic balances. It also designates the extension of employee shareholding
through the importance acquired by institutional investors in corporate financing and
governance, becoming an essential instance of the regulation of this growth regime’ (Aglietta,
1998:14).
‘Patrimonial capitalism’ inaugurates a new growth regime that can be summarized in the
following sequence: financial markets experience important transformations –due to general
liberalization and deregulation– crucially affecting corporate strategies and generating
fundamental changes in the behavior of households (which register a process of financial
patrimonialization). This sequence determines a growth regime qualitatively different from
Fordism, including reconfiguration of the wage-labor nexus defined by the extension of
employee shareholding. We shall now analyze this sequence in greater detail:
1

We consider Aglietta (1998 and 2005) as the references that inaugurate and establish the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach.
With this term we refer to a concept that, apart from some terminological discrepancies, involves the main works of these
authors. Boyer (2000) refers to this concept as ‘finance-led growth regime’, Chenais (2003) as ‘finance-led accumulation
regime’, Plihon (2004) as ‘shareholder capitalism’, and Aglietta, after years designating the new growth regime as ‘patrimonial
capitalism’, later (2004) changes to ‘financial capitalism’.
2
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a) Market Finances. The driving force responsible for the setting-up of the ‘patrimonial
capitalism’ dynamic are the newly liberalized financial markets. The determination and
allocation of savings and financing, formerly carried out by the banking system, are now
exercised by capital markets. By the term ‘market finances’ the authors refer to a new
financial environment, disintermediated and liberalized, where stock markets and institutional
investors are leading actors. As financing costs and terms are determined by the market, the
high degree of liquidity of financial markets gives investors an arbitration capacity that, in the
words of Orléan, allows finances to exercise their power 3 . This power is illustrated by the
tension between what Orléan denominates the ‘fundamental value’ and the ‘speculative
value’ of an equity; that is to say, between the productive and speculative natures of saving.
In the context of market finances, this tension is resolved in favor of the financial nature of
the equity; therefore, speculation dominates over productive performance. The link between
the prevalence of the speculative dimension and its effects on the economic performance is
expressed through the great growth of stock markets and the power of institutional investors
in these markets. Indeed, pension funds, investment funds, and insurance companies have
become leading actors in financial markets, increasing their weight in the GDP in terms of
assets from 70.5% in 1980 to 182.9% in 2004, in the US, and from 10% to 156.4% in France
(OECD, 2006).
b) Financialization of corporate strategies. The capacity of finances (fundamentally
through institutional investors) to impose their interests on nonfinancial corporations
connects financial markets with the general growth regime of accumulation, transforming this
regime. The development of liberalization and market finances give rise to diversified and
deep stock markets, with a growing presence of foreign capital. Although equity property is
dispersed between many institutional investors, its effective control is concentrated to a
reduced number of actors with great capacity to constrain corporations. Specifically,
institutional investors have the capacity to impose their own objectives (short-term and highly
financial) on nonfinancial corporations, forcing corporate performance to be subordinated in
order to obtain high and growing financial yields. Given the facility with which they may
reorganize their portfolio, the power of institutional investors in an environment of high
liquidity and deep of financial markets compels corporations to compete in capital markets
with the return offered to their shareholders. The new shareholder sovereignty –maximization
of shareholder value as the new managerial imperative– entails the development of the wellknown administrative principles of Corporate Governance 4 . These principles become
necessary measures for guaranteeing that managers assume the objectives of stock
markets, such as managers’ retributions being tied to market evolution (i.e., stock options), or
3

Following the term used by Orléan (1999) in the title of his book (Le Pouvoir de la Finance).
This is the Anglo-Saxon term used to denominate the specific type of governance raised by shareholder sovereignty. Orléan
(1999:219) reproduces the main indicators used to assess this type of governance.
4
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transparency norms for economic information being facilitated by corporations to
shareholders.
Therefore, the corporate strategies applied are those developed to obtain good results in
shareholder value indicators 5 . These measures try to increase the profit obtained per unit of
capital invested, by means of widespread cost-cutting. On one hand, managerial
restructurings are undertaken with the purpose of cutting both labor and capital costs:
mergers and acquisitions, offshoring, outsourcing, massive dismissals, refocusing and
concentration in the most profitable segments of the productive chain, abandonment of
productive diversification (substituted by financial diversification of institutional investors),
simplification of conglomerate organizational structures, and external growth through
leveraged buyouts. On the other hand, corporations develop financial strategies that are also
capable of increasing profitability through the reduction of share capital: financial leverage is
systematically used for share buybacks, in order to increase shareholder value and to satisfy
investors’ demands of high financial returns.
c) Households’ financial patrimonialization. Not only have corporations become more
dependent on financial markets; the performance of market finances has entailed a rise in
the financial patrimony of households 6 . According to calculations by Aglietta (2005) using
OECD data, the net financial patrimony of American and French households has increased
by 13% and 35%, respectively, between 1986-89 and 2001-02. Plihon (2004) maintains that
financial patrimony of households doubled in size in France between 1990 and 2002, while
household disposable income increased by only 50% in the same period. Financial
patrimony of French households constituted 60% of total patrimony in 2002, and 75% in the
case of US households. Financial patrimonialization of households is crucial for the
development of the new ‘patrimonial capitalism’ growth regime, on the basis of a feed-back
relationship. On one hand, the tendency of households to delegate the administration of their
financial patrimony has become possible thanks to institutional investors, who at the same
time have stimulated their own development. Institutional investors play as vital a role in the
spreading of a market dynamic through the financial sphere as in the active imposition of
shareholder sovereignty over corporations. Also, the rise of this patrimony has allowed
certain households to support the deterioration of wage revenues, due to corporate
restructuring.

Lastly,

the

‘patrimonial

capitalism’

approach

states

that

financial

patrimonialization has generated (through ‘wealth effects’) fundamental changes in the
aggregated demand configuration. Demand would no longer be harmed by wage
deterioration, since the market value of households’ financial assets (with a tendency to
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New methods of corporate governance assessment are used for this purpose, such as EVA (Economic Value Added), MVA
(Market Value Added), or ROE (Return on Equity), and minimum profitability benchmarks are set up for the different business
units of corporations, as has been pointed out by Aglieta (2000 and 2004) and Orléan (1999).
6
Regulationist authors identify population ageing as a main causal factor for households’ financial patrimonialization.
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overvaluation) would have a positive influence on private consumption. In this way,
households’ private consumption would supposedly be liberated from wages, arriving at a
point where salary cutbacks would not have a net negative effect on aggregated demand and
economic growth.
2.2. Labor in ‘patrimonial capitalism’: employee shareholding
According to the authors of this review, the new growth regime established by ‘patrimonial
capitalism’ has substantial effects on labor conditions. Indeed, the setting up of the new
corporate governance determines that a large part of the gap between financial yields,
claimed by capital markets and productive performance of corporations, affect workers via
different channels.
Although there are different interpretations within this research line 7 , all the authors
considered in this review argue that an immediate consequence of cost-reduction measures
and corporate restructurings is wage deterioration.
There are also other aspects of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ growth regime that destabilize the
wage-labor nexus, with workers absorbing more risks (compared with Fordism). Via various
channels, wage earnings shoulder the following new and considerable risks: the difference
between temporary horizons (demanded by financial markets) and productive performance,
with rising flexibility requirements; the rise in investment volatility; new corporate
restructurings and the resulting labor segmentation; and individualized wage earnings of
workers linked being to productivity or benefits.
Beginning here, Regulationist authors find enough causes to announce a substantial wagelabor nexus transformation 8 . Workers no longer enjoy a classical relationship with
corporations; moreover, deteriorated wage earnings and the growing weight of households’
financial patrimony –in an environment of continuous overvaluation of financial assets–
question the wage-based nature of working-class households. This issue is well summarized
within the debate around the previously mentioned ‘wealth effects’: if household patrimony is
so important that consumption and savings decisions depend more on stock market prices
than on the evolution of household wages, there is no reason to continue identifying such
households as working-class. Antagonisms between the working class and capital would no
longer exist 9 . This argument is reinforced not only by the fact that direct wages decrease
while patrimonial complements increase, but also because traditional components of indirect
and deferred wages –social security, health insurance, unemployment insurance and,

7

As we shall see, the Regulationist interpretation, with Aglietta representing its most extreme version, differs from the rest of the
authors.
8
This analysis is especially extreme in Aglietta (1998), although it can also be found in Aglietta (2004) and Aglietta (2005), and
in Orléan (1999). Boyer (2000 and 2001) maintains a much more moderated position.
9
To what extent demand becomes independent of wage-mass evolution (i.e., to what extent ‘wealth effects’ are truly operative)
is an important controversy among Regulationist authors. A synthesis of this controversy in the dialogue maintained by Aglietta
and Boyer can be found in their respective articles of 2000.
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especially, pensions 10 – are no longer contractually associated with workers’ labor status.
Instead they become services, to which access is guaranteed only by means of individual
accumulation of patrimony.
Aglietta therefore ends by considering that the wage-labor nexus suffers from changes of
such a nature that they completely redefine labor, questioning its wage-based determination:
wage components are no longer essential once we analyze the relationship between a
worker and his corporation.
This idea, summarized in the concept of employee shareholding, entails a whole redefinition
of the working class in the context of ‘patrimonial capitalism’. Workers no longer depend
substantially on their wage earnings, and their capital ownership status modifies their
‘working class’ essence in a definitive way. The property of capital, through the tenure of
shares by workers (both directly, through new compensation mechanisms, or indirectly, via
institutional investors) changes its nature and becomes ‘social’. In this way, financial
patrimonialization of households transforms them into ownerships, giving rise to a supposed
‘novelty for the salaried society: the arrival of the social property of capital’ (Aglietta, 1998:
41).
Therefore, the importance of financial patrimony for households and the effectiveness of
‘wealth effects’ to free demand from wage-mass are key elements in Aglietta’s analysis.
These allow him to interpret changes in wage-labor nexus as the emergence of a new
reconciliation between capital and labor. Employee shareholding –where interests would be
schizophrenically divided between labor and capital– would be the highest exponent of this
reconciliation.

3. Weaknesses of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach
The ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach and its analysis of the current world economy and
transformations in the wage-labor nexus are built upon constraints, as much theoretical as
empirical.
Nevertheless, the authors who grouped around what we call the ‘patrimonial capitalism’
approach come from distinct theoretical perspectives, and they develop different analyses,
especially when studying the effects of finances on labor transformations. For this reason we
are impelled to make certain discriminations in our review.
All of the authors considered here assume as a contrasted reality the deterioration suffered
by wage earnings in France and USA during recent decades, as well as the increase in risk
and uncertainty for labor. However, the theoretical interpretation pointed out by the

10

Aglietta (1998) considers new private pension systems –managed by capitalization– as a step forward in the progress of
society.
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‘Regulationist core’ (Aglietta, Orléan, and, to a lesser extent, Boyer) diverges substantially
from what Chesnais, Plihon, or Jeffers outline.
For the former, wage deterioration and increased risk for workers do not necessarily mean
either a loss of purchasing power or a labor regression in general: the loss in importance of
wage earnings and the growth of labor uncertainty are compensated by an increasing share
for workers in corporate ownership, either directly, or by means of equity holding in the stock
market, or through pension or mutual funds. We are therefore not talking about a labor
regression, but rather a reconfiguration of the wage-labor nexus. In this new wage-labor
nexus, workers experience losses as well as certain improvements 11 at the same time,
without evident net effect on living standards.
On the other hand, the other authors mentioned in this review (Chesnais, 2001; Chesnais
and Plihon, 2000; Plihon 2003 and 2004; Jeffers and Plihon, 2001) read the same
phenomenon from a different theoretical perspective: the decrease in wage earnings and the
increase in labor’s risk is not compensated by the patrimonialization of working households’
savings. Therefore, this phenomenon entails an effective regression of workers’ living
standards.
Although we consider this second interpretation to be more appropriate, these authors also
present a remarkable weakness by limiting their analysis of the wage-labor nexus
transformation to an expression of opposition to the arguments of Aglietta and Orléan. They
have not clarified the role played by labor regression in their analysis; neither have they
clarified the relation of this phenomenon with financialization.
Once we have reviewed this difference between various authors of the ‘patrimonial
capitalism’ approach, we will analyze the weaknesses of the Regulationist version.
Moreover, in the following section we will focus on an alternative interpretation that attempts
to overcome the limits detected in Chesnais, Jeffers, and Plihon.
There are two analytical levels on which we can distinguish deficiencies and weaknesses in
the analysis of the Regulationist authors: the theoretical and the empirical.
Without denying the growing access of French and American workers to financial markets, it
is necessary to point out that the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach does not correctly
conceptualize this phenomenon. The excessive emphasis it places on the entrance of
workers into such markets (employee shareholding) makes it difficult to focus this process on
its basic theoretical dimension: the shift in household savings to pension funds, investment
funds, or to direct shareholding – a shift from traditional wage-saving forms (real estate, bank
deposits, etc.) toward other, more profitable, forms (given the recent performance of the
world economy).

11

Supposedly, decision-making capacity, personal fulfillment and greater income possibilities (through profit sharing or financial
participation). Aglietta (1998).
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Therefore, although this savings transformation is extremely important to understand the
new patterns of macroeconomic performance in the US and France, it does not introduce,
from a theoretical perspective, a substantial change in the nature of labor. Workers still
depend in both economies on their labor force in order to subsist, and this dependence
cannot be surpassed by means of the management or financialization of their savings.
Furthermore, labor continues to discover how, in its attempt to maximize wage savings,
these savings are finally managed by different financial institutions (banks, pension funds,
investment funds...) to their own benefit, exactly as happened in previous periods.
Another analytical level where we can distinguish deficiencies and important omissions in the
Regulationist approach is the level of the empirical test.
These authors have insisted (Aglietta, 2000) –especially in the case of the US economy, but
also in the French case– on the importance to working households of revenues and
patrimony increments from financial sources (capital gains, dividends…). Such financial
revenues and capital gains would theoretically cause, as we have pointed out, the existence
of ‘wealth effects’, strengthening the links between household consumption and the evolution
of stock markets and financial profitability. Therefore, household consumption would become
relatively independent of the wage-mass.
This argument omits the fact that, according to OECD data (Boone and Girouard, 2002:
Table 2), less than 13% of households in France held stock shares in 2000. This figure,
according to the European Savings Institute, goes up to 23% if we consider stock shares
held through investment funds. In any case, ownership distribution among households has
not changed much: in 2000, only 7.4% of French households with a monthly income under
1.500€ held stock shares, compared to 11.2% of those with income between 1500€ and
2300€/month, and 14.3% of those between 2300€ and 3050€/month. These three groups
accounted for 83% of the total French population (64.5% in the first two groups) (Boone and
Girouard, 2002: table 2). Also, a study of the Observatory on employee shareholding in
Europe determines that workers held only 2.6% of Paris Stock Exchange capital in 2000
(Trebucq, 2001).
Even in the USA, where the number of households holding stock shares (either directly or
through pension and investment funds) is as high as 50%, we cannot ignore that 85% of the
stocks and mutual funds, and 89% of financial securities, were owned by just 10% of the
population in 2001 (Wolf, 2004: table 6). Moreover, 44% of stocks and mutual funds and 58%
of financial securities belonged at that time to the richest 1% of the population. That is to say,
for most working households, the supposed ‘wealth effects’ (consequent on increased stock
market prices) failed to operate: most household revenues remain linked to the wage-labor
nexus. As has been established by Maki and Palumbo (2001) for the US economy,
households which experienced an increase in the marginal propensity to consume during the
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1990s (the period of the ‘new economy’) came only from the top 20% of wealthiest
households. In other words, ‘all of the consumption boom really can be attributed to the
richest groups of households’ (2001: 22).
‘Wealth effects’ might operate somewhere in these economies, but certainly not for the
majority of the population. Therefore, the attempt to link ‘wealth effects’ to a general wagelabor nexus transformation in these economies constitutes an economic statement not based
on empirical evidence. While we can (perhaps, with difficulty) support this argument for
higher levels of the American working class, it is most certainly not the case for today’s
French working class.

4. An alternative interpretation of labor transformations: crisis and wage adjustment.
Beyond the mentioned limits of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach (excessive importance
given to ‘wealth effects’, lack of empirical evidence of the working households’ financial
patrimony, ambiguous extrapolation of US economic performance to European economies 12 ,
etc.), Aglietta, Orléan, and Boyer present an even more global weakness when analyzing
wage-labor nexus transformations.
The main vector of labor transformations during recent decades has been not so much
financial patrimonialization of working households as progressive and systematic
deterioration of the wage-labor nexus, as well as erosion of the victories attained by labor
after World War II. Labor regression has become a key variable in explaining the attempts to
exit the structural crisis of the 1970s.
Despite the arguments of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach, transformation of the wagelabor nexus along the last few decades has not been merely another transformation
experienced by the macroeconomic growth regime. In the same way, this transformation has
not brought about new opportunities or relative improvements for workers by means of
capital gains. On the contrary, wage has been the key variable upon which the main
economic transformations have been built in the US and France during the past thirty years.
And the outcome of this process has been a significant deterioration of employees’ living and
working conditions.
At the end of the 1960s, developed countries began to experience a fall in the profit rate,
which a few years later caused an accumulation short-circuit and an extended economic
crisis. Corporate overinvestment progressively undermined the marginal profitability of new
investments during the late 1960s (Marglin and Shor, 1991; Setterfield, 1997), which finally
precipitated the accumulation short-circuit and the beginning of a long period of weak
growth, increased unemployment, and public deficit increments, at which point a general
transformation of the postwar economic order took place.
12

Self-criticism of this point is in Boyer (1999)
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In this context, capital has led a powerful offensive over the last three decades to obtain a
recovery of the profit rate (Onaran, 2005; Duménil and Lévy, 2004a). This offensive –
worldwide in its dimension– has used diverse instruments with the objective of restoring
benefits: external opening of economies to transnational capital, progressive privatization of
productive sectors and public services, and market liberalization and deregulation. In Figure
1, we may observe how the general profit rate was recovered in the US and France, thanks
to this offensive: in 1982, this rate was 6.4% in the US and 10.4% in France; by 2006 it had
recovered to 13.8% in the US and 14.5% in France.

Figure 1: Profit Rate of US and French corporations, 1948-2006 (%)
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* Profit rate is defined as corporate profits divided by corporate net stock of private fixed assets.
Source: BEA, National Economic Accounts (2007); INSEE, Comptes nationaux annuels (2007)

These neoliberal policies (developed to enlarge and deepen profitability opportunities for
capital) have entailed an intense transformation of the wage-labor nexus. We can highlight
two measures in particular: labor market liberalization, and elimination of the ‘corset’
(imposed during the Keynesian period) to the speculative development of finances. Both
measures, together with external opening and privatization, have enabled an extraordinary
development of the financial sphere. ‘Patrimonial capitalism’ wisely highlights the central role
played by the ascent of financial capital in the reorganization of the world economy over the
past thirty years. Nevertheless, it does not correctly identify the ultimate meaning of the
movement deployed by finance. As Husson (2006) has pointed out, this ultimate goal has
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been to act as a lever for social reorganization among classes, to achieve a recovery in
profitability.
In this article we outline how that renewed ascent of financial capital is converted into labor
regression via two channels, direct and indirect. The first channel refers to wages,
employment, and working conditions, while the second is related to economic growth.
First we analyze the latter, or indirect channel. Again, the significant financial liberalization
experienced by international financial markets after the 1970s has reinforced the emergence
of a new growth regime. In this context, the financial sphere of the economy has taken
advantage of three instruments to drain profits away from nonfinancial corporations and
toward creditors and shareholders (Crotty, 2005; Duménil and Lévy, 2004a): high real
interest rates, increased corporate profits allocated to dividends, and buy-backs of shares by
the companies themselves. The overlapping of these three instruments has caused a
reduction in corporations’ rate of retained profit. Since retained profit is a key variable in
explaining corporate investment, these three instruments have implied slower rates of
accumulation during the 1980s and 90s, slower rhythms of employment creation, and higher
unemployment rates.
The US and French cases certainly well-illustrate this tendency of the profit rate, as can be
seen in Figures 2 and 3. In both diagrams we can distinguish how neoliberal policies have
restored nonfinancial corporations’ profit rate (before payments of interests and dividends).
Nevertheless, the rate of accumulation has not experienced a similar recuperation in either
country; and one reason for the downward tendency of accumulation is the plunge in
corporations’ retained profit rate 13 .

13

The retained profit rate of corporations is defined here considering only dividends and interest paid by corporations, and not
interest and dividends received. In this way, we try to separate two simultaneous processes, both related with the
financialization of corporate strategies. On one side, the process that we try to isolate in our definition of retained profit rate:
interest and dividend flows associated with the main operating activity of the corporation. A possible proxy of these flows are the
outflows (dividends and interests paid by corporations). On the other side, we exclude in our calculations financial inflows, most
of them related to the reorientation of nonfinancial corporations’ resources away from productive activities and toward financial
allocations.
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Figure 2: Profit rate, retained profit rate and rate of accummulation, US
nonfinancial corporations, 1948-2006 (%)
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*Profit rate and retained profit rate refer to left scale. Rate of accumulation refers to right scale. Both scales have been
normalized to a 0 to 10 scale.
**Profit rate is defined as corporate profits divided by net stock of private fixed assets. Retained profit rate is defined as
corporate profits less dividends and interests paid, divided by net stock of private fixed assets. Rate of accumulation is
defined as net fixed private investment divided by net stock of private fixed assets. All these rates take into
consideration only nonfinancial corporations data.
Source: BEA, National Economic Accounts (2007)

Figure 3: Profit rate, retained profit rate and rate of accummulation, French
nonfinancial corporations, 1978-2006 (%)
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This trend illustrates how finance has acted as a vehicle of income redistribution among
different social groups, allowing a global profitability recovery for capital at the expense of
corporate investment, employment levels, and (as we shall see) wages and working
conditions.
This macroeconomic performance must be clarified for the US economy: although the
evidence in Figure 2 shows how the slowed rate of accumulation during the 1980s parallels
the fall in the retained profit rate, the former rate vigorously increased during the 1990s’ ‘new
economy’ boom, making possible a rapid growth in employment (and hence low
unemployment levels).
Nevertheless, this macroeconomic performance is closely connected to the capacity of the
US economy (due to its singular hegemonic position) to attract massive amounts of savings
from the rest of the world, allowing the partial ‘disconnection’ between the retained profit rate
and the rate of accumulation that we see in Figure 2, with a growing capacity to ‘export’ the
consequences of neoliberal adjustment to the rest of the world. Even so, and as we see in
Figure 2, the US rate of accumulation during the 1990s did not reach the levels of the 1960s
and 70s.
The emergence of a new financial environment seems to be positioning the wage-mass as
an adjusting variable in the new growth regime (reducing corporate investment 14 ).
Nevertheless, the financialization process presents another, more direct link with labor
markets, which we shall now analyze.
A particularly outstanding phenomenon among quoted corporations both in New York and
Paris is the change in their ownership structures. The resurgence of financial capital has
taken place via the ascendancy of institutional investors, as instruments of coordinated
governance of said capital. Nowadays, these investors in many cases hold the majority stake
of quoted corporations’ capital. However, each of these investors separately holds only a
small share stake, generally less than 1-2% of a corporation’s capital stock (Denis and
McConnell, 2003; Roe, 1994; Morin, 2000 and 2002) 15 . As such, financial risk is greatly
diversified, since investors can at any time put their insufficiently profitable shares up for
sale, given the context of deep liberalization and liquidity in US and French stock markets.
Investors therefore have the ability to immediately punish those corporations that fail to
follow their dictates.
This change in corporate ownership structure and the remarkable liquidity of financial
markets have together imposed the untouchable objective of short-term financial profitability
as the paramount concern of corporate governance (Commissariat Général du Plan, 2002).

14

For a detailed analysis about how market finances contribute to the slowdown of corporate investment, see Duménil and Lévy
(2004), Chesnais (2004), Eatwell and Taylor (2000), Aglietta (2005), and Commissariat Général du Plan (2002).
15
This causes what we can be called the ‘piranha effect’: usually, any institutional investor is alone strong enough to modify a
corporation’s strategies, but the coordinated intervention of several is generally decisive for corporate governance.
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The dissemination of this objective among quoted corporations of the US Dow Jones or
French CAC-40 has meant a progressive financialization of corporate strategies,
understanding ‘financialization’ as a subordination of these strategies to the maximization of
financial profitability.
Financialization of corporate strategies in the US and French productive sectors has entailed
the emergence of a new set of common practices on both sides of the Atlantic (Batsch,
2002). These practices have direct consequences on the administration of labor forces and,
in general, on the wage-labor nexus transformation. ‘Patrimonial capitalism’ authors have
pointed out, albeit with unequal emphasis, the importance of these new corporate strategies
(Chesnais and Plihon, 2000; Plihon, 2004): mergers and acquisitions have made reduction in
the wage-mass possible, thanks to new synergies and economies of scale arising from
capital concentration; the reduction and partition of corporate assets (outsourcing,
disinvestment and downsizing, refocusing…), vigorously encouraged by institutional
investors, have divided the corporate labor force; stock repurchase plans to increase
shareholder value –generally through strong leverage– have displaced some financial and
credit risk toward workers; offshoring has permitted fulfillment under better conditions of the
short-term demands of financial markets; and, finally, the development of flexible production
has allowed many corporations to adopt the new brief horizons of capital valorization,
helping to maximize shareholder value.
Financialization of corporate strategies has a clear consequence on the labor market: the
progressive weakening of trade unions and workers’ bargaining power. This growing fragility
of workers vis-a-vis capital structures in the collective-bargaining process has positioned
wages as an adjusting variable for the US and French economies, by three mechanisms:

a) A first channel of adjustment of the wage-mass has been the relative destruction
and substitution of employment during recent decades. One way to approach this
phenomenon is by observing the evolution of unemployment. This channel has been of
particular importance in France, as we can see in Figure 4: during the 1980s and 90s,
unemployment increased into the double-digits. This phenomenon is intimately linked
to the aforementioned decline in the rate of accumulation. A similar tendency can be
observed for the US economy during the 1980s.
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Figure 4: Unemployement Rate (%), US and France, 1960-2006
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Although there is an interruption in the US unemployment increase during the 1990s,
as can be seen in Figure 4, this economy continues to destroy and substitute jobs
throughout the period. Relative destruction and substitution of employment is a more
complex phenomenon: apart from the net employment created by the US economy, it
is necessary to analyze the rate of job loss (annual average number of jobs lost as a
proportion of the labor force). As Farber (1997) has pointed, the rate of job loss in the
US stood at about 14% during the first half of the 1990s, even higher than the already
substantial 10% rate of the 1980s. And this tendency continued during the second half
of the 1990s, as it has been pointed out by Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000).
Restructuring and downsizing of the labor force has been one of the main strategies of
corporations to transfer the costs of economic adjustment to workers. Consequently, a
deep restructuring of the US labor force has taken place: many stable and well-paid
jobs in manufacturing and services have been substituted by unstable and precarious
employment.

b) A second channel of adjustment of the wage-mass has been the salary freeze.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, one tendency has been reversed: wage no longer
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increases above the growth rate of productivity (as used to happen in the 1960s and
70s).
The break-up of this tendency –more intense in the US economy than in France, as
can be seen in Figures 5 and 6– has been made possible by a sustained freeze of real
wages. This salary freeze has been caused in part by the aforementioned weakness of
labor in collective bargaining.
Figure 5: Productivity and real earnings growth, total private sector, US 1950-2006
(% annual rate)
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Figure 6: Productivity and real earnings growth, private sector, France 1960-2006
(% annual rate)
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c) In third place, and due to labor market liberalization and a progressive erosion of the
trade union victories of previous decades, financial investors and corporations have
been able to partially transfer their economic risk to workers. A good sample of this can
be found in the US labor market: in spite of the capacity of the ‘American Job Machine’
to create employment, 35% of laid-off workers remained unemployed two years later.
Moreover, those workers who were able to find a job after a layoff earned a wage 13%
lower than before (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: p.20).
In France, the labor turnover rate increased from 22% to 36% between 1983 and 2002
in firms with more than fifty employees.

These are not the only channels that link economic financialization with the adjusting role of
wages. While we will not further analyze this issue, we should not forget how the economic
policies of the US and France have entailed cut-offs in both indirect wages (health insurance,
education, social services and subsidies...) and deferred wages (unemployment insurance
and pensions). Neoliberal policies developed by the public sector to favor a market finance
context have trapped the State in its own financial labyrinth: the need to attract and retain
international financial capital, as well as financing needs of public debt, have meant a
progressive cutting of public expenditure (and therefore, of indirect and deferred wages)
through the 1980s and 90s, as well as a reinforcement of privatization programs and a more
regressive taxation system.

5. Economic, social, and labor consequences of wage adjustment.
The consequences of the process of wage adjustment on workers’ living conditions have
been different in the US economy and in France. Nevertheless, both cases illustrate the
common offensive by capital against labor and against social conquests achieved by the
working class and its organizations after World War II, on both sides of the Atlantic. Erosion
of these conquests should not be conceptualized as ‘negative externalities’ of the process of
wage adjustment, but rather as its ultimate objective and significance.
In France, the freeze of real wages during the past twenty five years (with an annual growth
rate of 0.8% during 1980-2006), together with high rates of unemployment, have caused an
effective blockade of purchasing power. The annual growth rate of the Leclerc-BIPE
purchasing power index was 1.0% between 1990-2002, while the debt-to-gross disposable
income ratio of households went up, from 32% in 1980 to almost 60% in 2004.
Also, strategies of employment flexibilization have caused an increase in precarious
employment and economic risk for workers in France: according to Eurostat, temporary
employment increased from 3.3% in 1983 to 12.8% in 2006, while partial employment moved
from 9.6% to 17.3% during the same period (the percentage of involuntary part-time jobs
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was 30% of total part-time employment in 2006). Additionally, the rate of transition from
temporary to permanent employment dropped from 40% in 1989 to 33% in 2001 (Enquête
Emploi 1989-2002, INSEE).
As shown by the French MES-DARES National Survey on Working Conditions, the growing
precariousness of employment has meanwhile been accompanied by a remarkable increase
in the pace of work in corporations. The proportion of industrial workers subject to rules or
delays of less than one day increased from 31% in 1984 to 61% in 1998.
Nevertheless, given the particular labor and political organization in France, there is no
evidence of an increased working day in the last twenty five years, nor of a relevant increase
in inequality among working households. In 1980, the annual number of working hours was
1,808, decreasing to 1,616 hours in 2004.
In the US economy, we have already seen how the main channel of adjustment during this
period has been the real wage freeze (and even its deterioration). When we analyze the
hourly and weekly earnings of workers, we observe how real wages in the corporate sector
declined not only in the 1980s but also in the first half of the 1990s. As we can see in Table
1, real average hourly earnings, in constant 1982 dollars, went down from US$8 in 1980 to
US$7.53 in 1995. Weekly earnings have experienced a faster deterioration: they dropped
from US$281.27 in 1980 to US$262.43 in 1990, then to US$258.43 in 1995 and up to
US$278.66 in 2006 (in constant 1982 dollars).
This process has been accompanied by a significant rise in the annual number of work
hours. US households have experienced a rise from 1,523 annual work hours in 1980, to
1,816 in 2000, with a corresponding increase from 43.7 to 47.0 working weeks per year. This
trend has obviously been determined by the incorporation of women into labor market; even
so, if we consider only men, we observe a rise of around 100 annual work hours between
1980 and 2000.
TABLE 1: Hours and earnings in private sector, 1965–2006
Annual Work Hours 1

Year
Husbands

1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2006

2.112,9
2.130,1
2.185,4
2.235,3
2.212,3

Wives

933,0
1.029,6
1.215,1
1.322,3
1.420,0

Mean
Households

1.522,9
1.579,9
1.700,3
1.778,8
1.816,1

Total
equivalent
weeks per
household

43,7
44,5
45,4
45,9
47,0

Average hourly
earnings 2

Average weekly
earnings, total private 2

Total private

Level

Current
dollars

2,63
3,40
4,73
6,84
8,73
10,19
11,64
14,00
16,11
16,73

1982
dollars

8,04
8,46
8,48
7,99
7,91
7,66
7,53
8,03
8,17
8,23

3

Current
dollars

1982 dollars

101,52
125,80
170,28
240,77
304,68
349,29
399,53
480,41
543,65
566,79

310,46
312,94
305,16
281,27
276,23
262,43
258,43
275,62
275,82
278,66

3

1 Annual Work Hours for Middle-Income Husbands and Wives with Children, age 25-54
2 For production or nonsupervisory workers in private nonagricultural industries.
3 Current dollars divided by the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers on a 1982=100 base.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007) ; The State of Working America 2004-05, Figure 1T
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The consequences of unequal access to capital ownership in terms of revenues were
reinforced during the 1980s and 90s, fueling a spectacular growth of social inequality in US
society: in 1980, the richest 20% of the US population held 41.1% of aggregate family
income; by 2003 this share had increased to 47.6%. If we take the aggregate family income
received by the richest 5% of the population, the percentage for 1980 and 2003 was 14.6%
and 20.5%, respectively. Going beyond aggregate family income, we further observe the
evolution of global wealth (including financial and real estate wealth, plus durable
consumption goods), as well as an increase in wealth concentration. According to Wolff
(1996), the richest 1% of the US population concentrated little more than 20% of total wealth
in 1980; in 2000, after decades of liberalization, deregulation, and neoliberal adjustment, this
rose to 38%.
Therefore, the various channels of wage adjustment have caused in the US and France not
just erosion of the wage-labor nexus and of the social victories of the postwar period, but
also a great process of income redistribution between capital and labor. The blockage of real
wages during the past thirty years has caused a fall in the wage-share ratio in the US and
French economies, in favor of corporate and financial benefits.

Figure 7: Wage share, US and France, 1978-2005 (%)
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Source: BEA, National Economic Accounts (2007); INSEE, Comptes nationaux annuels (2007)

When we analyze in greater detail this process of income transfer between social classes,
we observe that financial capitalists are the class-fraction most favored. As Epstein et al.
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(2003) have shown, the Rentier income share 16 increased spectacularly over the 1960-2000
period, both in USA and France.
According to our own calculations, presented in Figures 8 and 9, the recovery of the profit
rate in the US and France has been much sharper for financial corporations than for
nonfinancial corporations. Therefore, yields for financial capital have grown much faster than
real profitability throughout the period.

Figure 8: Profit rate, financial and nonfinancial corporations, US 1981-2006 (%)
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*Profit rate is defined according to methodology used in Figure 1 (splitting up data for financial and nonfinancial
corporations). Scale is not normalized in this case.
Source: BEA, National Economic Accounts (2007)
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Defined as profits realized by firms engaged in financial market activities, plus interest income realized by all nonfinancial,
non-government resident institutional units, i.e. the rest of the private economy.
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Figure 9: Profit rate, financial and nonfinancial corporations, France 1978-2006 (%)
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*Profit rate is defined according to methodology used in Figure 1 (splitting up data for financial and nonfinancial
corporations). Scale is not normalized in this case.
Source: INSEE, Comptes nationaux annuels (2007)

6. Conclusions:
Liberalization and deregulation, led by financial capital, have made possible the rise of a new
macroeconomic regime in France and the United States. Resurgent financial capital has
been a powerful instrument of social transformation, allowing the restoration of global
profitability at the expense of wages and working conditions. But when compared to the
1950-80 period, capital accumulation and growth have not been restored as such during
recent decades.
Therefore, the resurgence of financial capital over the past thirty years, and the mounting
subordination of productive and labor dynamics to finance, should not be viewed so much as
the expression of supposed conflict between financial capital and productive capital 17 but
rather as a lever for global transformation in capital-labor relations.
In this work we have tried to review from a critical perspective the ‘patrimonial capitalism’
approach, as well as its analysis of global transformations taking place in developed
economies for the last thirty years. For this purpose, we have taken the French and US
economies as study cases. This review should allow us to reinforce an open and
unconcluded line of research, such as has been presented here in a tentative way. Of
17

As can sometimes be deduced from Chesnais (2004)
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particular interest would be to incorporate into our theoretical proposal the important
contributions contained in the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach, as well as to deepen our
analysis of the main weaknesses of said approach.
The ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach has been valuable in bringing different authors
together into an unquestionably important debate. In spite of its multiple variants and the
divergent analyses presented by different authors, the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach has
greatly contributed to the critical debate about the rise of market finances at the end of the
20th century, along with the causes and consequences of that rise. One example would be
the analysis of the transition from a regulated finance regime to a market finance regime.
Furthermore, another outstanding contribution of this approach has been to identify causal
links among aforementioned changes in the financial sphere, and their consequences on
corporate governance. The study of the links between institutional investors and capital
ownership of US and French corporations, the changes in said capital ownership, or the
consequences that
financialization

of

these factors have had –via corporate governance– in terms of
corporate

strategies,

all

constitute

an

undeniable

advance

in

understanding the world economy.
Still, as we have already pointed out, weaknesses of the ‘patrimonial capitalism’ approach
when analyzing the main labor transformations of recent decades are also important. These
weaknesses are significant throughout all variants and authors of the approach, although
they are especially important in the ‘Regulationist core’. Taking these weaknesses as a
possible starting point, we can identify some preliminary conclusions.
First of all, it is impossible to analyze the transformations experienced by labor in developed
economies during recent decades without first undertaking a global analysis of changes to
the world economy during this period – particularly changes relative to economic
financialization. It is thus necessary to understand capital’s offensive during 1980s and 90s
as a key factor in the analysis of labor transformations, centering on the particular
instruments (liberalization, deregulation, privatization, flexibilization…) used by capital to
restore the rate of profit. In a complementary way, neither is it possible to understand the
dimension of recent, major transformations in the US and French economies without due
consideration of mutations to the Fordist wage-labor nexus.
Again, the deterioration of direct, indirect, and deferred wages has played a central role in
this wage-labor nexus transformation. This process of wage erosion has furthermore
resulted in a decrease of the labor income share. Therefore, we witness through this process
a progressive collapse of the main social victories attained by labor during the 20th century.
Analysis of the wage-labor nexus transformation and erosion of social advances should not
be considered merely in a quantitative way. Other, qualitative aspects of the wage-labor
nexus are also significant and have also been modified in the past few decades, including for
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example the increasing economic risk and social uncertainty associated with labor. In this
way, a new generation of labor has grown up under temporary, part-time, uncertain, and
precarious working conditions.
To assess all these changes, their depth and their links to financialization, there is no need
to redefine the nature of the capital-labor relationship. On the contrary, a class analysis is
necessary to full understanding of wage-labor nexus transformations. Therefore, it makes no
sense to expect the arrival of a hypothetical ‘social capitalism’, where collective interests of
corporations can be achieved while avoiding the confrontation of capital and labor. ‘Popular
capitalism’ and the claim that stock markets are ‘meeting points’ –sites of social engagement
and class dissolution– are simply attempts at apologetic mystification, a strategy not
unknown in the history of Economics. Nevertheless, these concepts seem to currently
underlie certain analyses coming from the academic heterodoxy.
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